2010考研英語(yǔ)閱讀精讀100篇(高分版)TEXT SEVEVTEEN
　　When there is blood in the water, it is only natural that dorsal fins swirl around excitedly. Now that America's housing market is ailing, predators have their sights on the country's credit-card market. Analysts at Goldman Sachs reckon that credit-card losses could reach $99 billion if contagion spreads from subprime mortgages to other forms of consumer credit. Signs of strain are clearly visible. There are rises in both the charge-off and delinquency rates, which measure the share of balances that are uncollectable or more than 30 days late respectively. HSBC announced last month that it had taken a $1.4 billion charge in its American consumer-finance business, partly because of weakness among card borrowers.

　　It is too early to panic, though. Charge-offs and delinquencies are still low. According to Moody's, a rating agency, the third-quarter delinquency rate of 3.89% was almost a full percentage point below the historical average. The deterioration in rates can be partly explained by technical factors. A change in America's personal-bankruptcy laws in 2005 led to an abrupt fall in bankruptcy filings, which in turn account for a big chunk of credit-card losses; the number of filings (and thus charge-off rates) would be rising again, whether or not overall conditions for borrowers were getting worse.

　　The industry also reports solid payment rates, which show how much of their debt consumers pay off each month. And confidence in credit-card asset-backed securities is pretty firm despite paralysis in other corners of structured finance. Dennis Moroney of TowerGroup, a research firm, predicts that issuance volumes for 2007 will end up being 25% higher than last year.

　　Direct channels of infection between the subprime-mortgage crisis and the credit-card market certainly exist: consumers are likelier to load up on credit-card debt now that home-equity loans are drying up. But card issuers look at cash flow rather than asset values, so falling house prices do not necessarily trigger a change in borrowers' creditworthiness. They may even work to issuers' advantage. The incentives for consumers to keep paying the mortgage decrease if properties are worth less than the value of the loan; card debt rises higher up the list of repayment priorities as a result.

　　Card issuers are also able to respond much more swiftly and flexibly to stormier conditions than mortgage lenders are, by changing interest rates or altering credit limits. That should in theory reduce the risk of a rapid repricing of assets. “We are not going to wake up one day and totally revalue the loans,” says Gary Perlin, Capital One's chief financial officer.

　　If a sudden subprime-style meltdown in the credit-card market is improbable, the risks of a sustained downturn are much more real. If lower house prices and a contraction in credit push America into recession, the industry will undoubtedly face a grimmer future. Keep watching for those dorsal fins.

　　1. The author makes mention of dorsal fins which are irrelevant to the topic in order to _____

　　[A] make people alert to the potential danger.

　　[B] attract the readers’ attention by presenting an interesting phenomenon.

　　[C] make people realize the graveness of the issue by showing a similar case.

　　[D] make the passage more vivid by imparting new knowledge to readers.

　　2. Rises in the charge-off and delinquency rate indicate _____

　　[A] the deterioration of the subprime mortgage.

　　[B] the inadequate ability of card borrowers.

　　[C] the influence of the technical factors.

　　[D] the change in relevant laws.

　　3. According to the third paragraph, the number of bankruptcy fillings would be rising again because_____

　　[A] there is a change in America’s personal-bankruptcy laws.

　　[B] the charge-offs and delinquencies are still low.

　　[C] the influence of the personal-bankruptcy laws has been digested.

　　[D] the overall conditions for borrowers are getting worse.

　　4. The subprime-mortgage crisis influnces the credit-card market in that_____

　　[A] the fall of asset values affects the card borrowers’ creditworthiness.

　　[B] the decrease in the mortgage payment leads to the rises of the card debt.

　　[C] the drying up of the home-equity loans spur consumers’ incectives to repay the card debt.

　　[D] the falling house prices makes the card debt rising higher.

　　5. According to the author, the credit-card market will more likely be threatened by_____

　　[A] a gradual downward tendency.

　　[B] a rapid collapse.

　　[C] a sustained trend of lowering price.

　　[D] the accumulation of economic recession.

　　文章剖析：

　　這篇文章分析了美國(guó)次級(jí)抵押貸款危機(jī)可能影響到的信用卡市場(chǎng)。第一段指出信用卡市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)疲軟跡象;第二、三段通過(guò)分析表示信用卡市場(chǎng)危機(jī)并未確定，不需要過(guò)于恐慌;第四段指出次級(jí)抵押危機(jī)與信用卡市場(chǎng)之間的傳染渠道;第五段指出信用卡規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的優(yōu)勢(shì);第六段指出信用卡市場(chǎng)趨于經(jīng)歷持續(xù)低迷的情況。

　詞匯注釋：

　　dorsal fin n.[動(dòng)物]背鰭

　　ailing adj. 景況不佳的，生病的

　　contagion n.傳染, 傳染病, 蔓延

　　charge-off n. 損耗

　　delinquency n. 逾期債款

　　難句突破：

　　(1) There are rises in both the charge-off and delinquency rates, which measure the share of balances that are uncollectable or more than 30 days late respectively.

　　[主體句式] There are rises in…

　　[結(jié)構(gòu)分析] 這是一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單句，which 引導(dǎo)的非限定性定語(yǔ)從句是修飾前面的the charge-off and delinquency rates;在該定語(yǔ)從句中還有定語(yǔ)從句修飾the share of balances，在該定語(yǔ)從句中，前半個(gè)句子對(duì)應(yīng)修飾the charge-off rates，后半個(gè)句子是個(gè)省略句，對(duì)應(yīng)修飾the delinquency rates.

　　[句子譯文] 損耗率和逾期債款率都有所上升，這兩個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)分別代表無(wú)法回收以及逾期30天的收支差額份額。

　　(2) A change in America's personal-bankruptcy laws in 2005 led to an abrupt fall in bankruptcy filings, which in turn account for a big chunk of credit-card losses; the number of filings (and thus charge-off rates) would be rising again, whether or not overall conditions for borrowers were getting worse.

　　[主體句式] A change led to an abrupt fall; the number would be rising.

　　[結(jié)構(gòu)分析]這是一個(gè)復(fù)雜句，分號(hào)將前后兩個(gè)句子隔開(kāi)。前面句子中，賓語(yǔ)帶有which引導(dǎo)的非限定性定語(yǔ)從句;后面句子是帶有方式狀語(yǔ)從句的復(fù)雜句。

　　[句子譯文]2005年美國(guó)個(gè)人破產(chǎn)法的一個(gè)改動(dòng)使得破產(chǎn)登記急速下降，而后引起了信用卡的大規(guī)模虧損。不管貸款人的整體狀況是否變得更糟糕了，破產(chǎn)登記數(shù)量(緊跟的沖銷率)可以重新上升。

　　題目分析：

　　[答案]A

　　[難度系數(shù)] ☆☆☆

　　[分析]推理題。文章在首尾都提到了背鰭。開(kāi)頭提到一旦水中有血，背鰭就會(huì)變得興奮起來(lái)，接著就提到美國(guó)房地產(chǎn)衰退后，捕食者將目光轉(zhuǎn)移到信用卡市場(chǎng)。末尾提到要留心背鰭�？梢钥闯�，作者提到背鰭是一種隱喻，意味著危險(xiǎn)，因此選項(xiàng)A 比較符合題意。

　　[答案]B

　　[難度系數(shù)] ☆☆

　　[分析] 推理題。文章在第一段提到，信用卡市場(chǎng)的疲軟跡象已經(jīng)出現(xiàn)，接著就提到這兩個(gè)數(shù)字，損耗率和逾期債款率分別代表無(wú)法收回來(lái)的收支差額的份額和晚付了30天的份額，接著還舉例說(shuō)香港匯豐銀行的14億美元費(fèi)用就是部分因?yàn)樾庞每ń杩钊藘斶�能力較弱。因此，這兩項(xiàng)升高表明信用卡市場(chǎng)出現(xiàn)問(wèn)題。A不符合;B，是信用卡市場(chǎng)問(wèn)題;CD在第二段提到，是引起這兩項(xiàng)升高的部分原因所在。因此，答案為B。

　　[答案]C

　　[難度系數(shù)] ☆☆☆

　　[分析] 推理題。文章第三段比較后提到不管貸款人整體的情況是否變壞，破產(chǎn)申請(qǐng)數(shù)量都會(huì)再次增多。前面又提到是因?yàn)?005年美國(guó)個(gè)人破產(chǎn)法有一定變化，破產(chǎn)申請(qǐng)才急劇降低，而后引發(fā)了信用卡市場(chǎng)的一些問(wèn)題。因此，這項(xiàng)法律實(shí)行一段時(shí)間后，大家已經(jīng)消化了這個(gè)變化，趨勢(shì)又會(huì)恢復(fù)正常。答案C比較為貼切。

　　[答案]C

　　[難度系數(shù)] ☆☆☆

　　[分析] 細(xì)節(jié)題。文章第四段提到次級(jí)抵押貸款危機(jī)和信用卡市場(chǎng)之間有直接感染的通道，因?yàn)榧彝ベY產(chǎn)貸款衰竭，借款人就更愿意把信用卡的貸款償還清;而且因?yàn)榉课莸膬r(jià)格比貸款還低，大家就不愿意還房屋抵押貸款，因此信用卡貸款償還在償還方面位居前列。選項(xiàng)中C符合這種推理，為正確答案。

　　[答案]A

　　[難度系數(shù)] ☆☆☆

　　[分析] 細(xì)節(jié)題。文章比較后一段指出，次級(jí)抵押貸款式的突然垮臺(tái)可能不會(huì)出現(xiàn)在信用卡市場(chǎng)，更容易出現(xiàn)的是一種持續(xù)不斷的低迷。因此，信用卡市場(chǎng)更可能受到這種緩慢的低迷趨勢(shì)的影響。答案A比較為符合題意。

　　參考譯文：

　　如果水中有血的話，那么很自然的背鰭就會(huì)興奮地游來(lái)游去�，F(xiàn)在美國(guó)的房產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)景況不佳，掠奪者就把目光轉(zhuǎn)向了這個(gè)國(guó)家的信用卡體系。高盛公司的分析師們認(rèn)為如果這種趨勢(shì)從次級(jí)抵押擴(kuò)散到消費(fèi)者信用的其他形式的話，那么信用卡損失可能要達(dá)到990億美元。目前這種趨緊的跡象已經(jīng)顯現(xiàn)。損耗率和逾期債款率都有所上升，這兩個(gè)數(shù)據(jù)分別代表無(wú)法回收以及逾期30天的收支差額份額。匯豐銀行上個(gè)月宣布其在美國(guó)消費(fèi)者金融行業(yè)的抵押款為14億美元，部分原因就在于信用卡貸款人的弱勢(shì)。

　　但現(xiàn)在恐慌還為時(shí)尚早。沖銷和逾期債款率還不是很高。據(jù)一家評(píng)估機(jī)構(gòu)Moody's估算，第三季度3.89%的逾期債款率比歷史平均值還低整整一個(gè)百分點(diǎn)。比率變差部分是由于技術(shù)原因。2005年美國(guó)個(gè)人破產(chǎn)法的一個(gè)改動(dòng)使得破產(chǎn)登記急速下降，而后引起了信用卡的大規(guī)模虧損。不管貸款人的整體狀況是否變得更糟糕了，破產(chǎn)登記數(shù)量(緊跟的沖銷率)可以重新上升。

　　該行業(yè)還報(bào)告了真正的支付率，即表示有多少貸款消費(fèi)者每個(gè)月還清貸款。盡管在其他結(jié)構(gòu)性金融部分出現(xiàn)了癱瘓，但是對(duì)信用卡負(fù)債支持的有價(jià)證券還是充滿信心。一家研究機(jī)構(gòu)TowerGroup的工作人員Dennis Moroney 預(yù)計(jì)2007年發(fā)行數(shù)量比較終將比去年高出25%。

　　次級(jí)抵押危機(jī)和信用卡市場(chǎng)之間存在直接的傳染渠道，既然家庭資產(chǎn)貸款就衰竭了，消費(fèi)者更傾向于將信用卡的貸款用滿。但是信用卡發(fā)行人看到的是現(xiàn)金流動(dòng)而不是資產(chǎn)價(jià)值，因此房產(chǎn)價(jià)格的下降并不一定會(huì)帶來(lái)貸款人信用額度的改變，甚至?xí)�有利于發(fā)行人。如果消費(fèi)者的財(cái)產(chǎn)不及貸款金額，那么消費(fèi)者一直支付抵押貸款的動(dòng)機(jī)就會(huì)削弱，其結(jié)果就是信用卡貸款就會(huì)成為比較先需要償還的款項(xiàng)。

　　信用卡發(fā)行人也可以在遇到更為嚴(yán)峻的情況時(shí)，通過(guò)改變利率或信用額度，比房屋抵押借款人作出更快、更靈活的反應(yīng)。這在理論上可以降低資產(chǎn)快速重新定價(jià)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。“我們不希望有天一睜開(kāi)眼就得重新估算全部貸款，”Capital One的首席金融官員Gary Perlin這樣說(shuō)。

　　如果在信用卡市場(chǎng)中那種次級(jí)抵押式的突如其來(lái)的徹底崩潰是不可能的話，那么持續(xù)低迷的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)是更為真實(shí)的。如果房產(chǎn)低價(jià)格和信貸緊縮將美國(guó)引致衰退，那么該行業(yè)將會(huì)面臨更慘淡的未來(lái)。時(shí)刻留心那些背鰭吧。